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India-UK extradition law and practice need reform. This is particularly acute 
as regards the rendition of persons from the UK to India. The number of 
Indian requests, their success rate and the nature of the crimes and 
individuals subject to them support this fact.1 The central and most weighty 
argument in favour of reform is simply that extant law and practice is not 
meeting its purpose. The reasons for this are that either general extradition 
requirements are not met or that the applicable bars to the process are 
successfully invoked. There are three further arguments favouring reform. 
The first is that there is historical precedent for a relatively streamlined 
approach. Reviving aspects of previous law would undoubtedly improve the 
current situation. The second is that India has been left behind in the 
modernisation of UK extradition relations. Ending the resultant 
differentiation in UK practice is called for. Thirdly and finally, reform is 
desirable in the light India’s emergence as a leading power, the UK’s 
departure from the European Union and the new political will in both 
countries to enhance criminal co-operation. The case for reform is also ripe, 
and not merely because of Brexit.2 It is timely on account of the increased 
importance, growth and profile of extradition requests by India to the UK in 
recent years. Notable here are the cases of Vijay Mallya, Nirav Modi and 
Sanjeev Chawla.3 Overall it appears clear that the scale, nature and fate of 
Indian extradition requests to the UK, the new geopolitical realities and the 
heightened desire to co-operate combine to beg the question of whether it 
is time to reconsider the terms and nature of extradition law and practice 
between India and the UK.4 The answer is an unequivocal yes. 
 
                                       
1 This article will not discuss the converse situation. For a criticism of Indian law in 
this regard see Subramanian, S.R., The Role of Human Rights in Extradition: The 
Imperatives of Reforming the Indian Extradition Law, (2014) 40(2) Commonwealth 
Law Bulletin 233. It has been reported that from 2002 to 2019 India has extradited 
four persons to the UK, see Ministry of External Affairs, at 
https://www.mea.gov.in/byindia.htm.  
2 The UK has legislated for a ‘no-deal’ Brexit, where extradition with former EU 
partners is intended to take place under the European Convention on Extradition 
1957. 
3 These cases are mentioned below.  
4 This is in spite of then Home Secretary Rajiv Mehrishi stating in July 2017 that no 
change was needed in the treaty, see https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/no-
change-needed-in-india-uk-extradition-treaty-says-top-official-in-london-
1726185. In contrast Subramanian argues that Indian extradition law needs “… a 
complete overhaul… so that India truly and effectively cooperates with other 
countries in criminal matters”, supra note 1 at p 235. 
The research question addressed in this article is whether the UK-India 
extradition relationship requires reform. The reasons in favour of revisiting 
that relationship are examined through analysis of existing extradition law 
and practice, the jurisprudence arising therefrom, the historical position of 
the subject in India-UK relations, the UK’s practice with certain third states, 
the changed political dynamics resultant from India’s rise in power and 
stature and the UK’s departure from the EU and the increased scale and 
importance of Indian extradition requests to the UK. The methodology taken 
in addressing the research question entails a textual analysis of the law, 
jurisprudence, statistics and literature relating to India-UK extradition law 
and practice. Overall, the theme of the article is that together a number of 
disparate factors coalesce and give rise to a strong case in support of the 
reform of extradition law and practice between the two states. 
 
2. The Context of the Case for Reform 
 
2.1 Purposes of Extradition 
 
In order to construct an argument in favour of the reform of India-UK 
extradition law and practice the purposes of extradition must be outlined. 
This is because it is only possible to adjudge the process if its goals are 
manifest. The purposes of extradition are two-fold, and contradictory. They 
are the facilitation of international criminal co-operation through the 
rendition of accused and convicted persons, and the provision of protection 
to requested persons from unfair and egregious treatment. Both purposes 
are found in the applicable convention, the India-UK Extradition Treaty 
1992. Its preamble inter alia provides that the parties desire “… to make 
more effective the cooperation of the two countries in the suppression of 
crime…” and that they recognise that “… concrete steps are necessary to 
combat terrorism”.5 The protective aspect of extradition law is found in 
article 9. It allows for the refusal of a request in circumstances including 
where an individual is sought for his political opinions, it would be unjust or 
oppressive and where the extradition offence is trivial. Clearly these 
purposes may be at odds with each other. As Warbrick notes “The conflict 
between the cooperative and protective functions of extradition law creates 
a certain tension…”.6 The protective purpose of extradition can explain why 
certain extradition requests are refused. In one sense, then, the law is 
meeting one of its purposes in such cases. They are not necessarily 
evidence of failure nor supportive of reform. On the other hand, however, 
the factors giving rise to the need for protection may themselves be the 
                                       
5 Cited at https://mea.gov.in/Images/CPV/leta/UK_Extradition_Treaties.pdf. 
Hereinafter the 1992 Treaty. It entered into force 15 November 1993. 
6 Warbrick, C., The Criminal Justice Act 1988 – Part 1: The New Law on Extradition, 
(1989) Criminal Law Review 4 at p 5-6, footnotes omitted. 
result of a failing, of the efficiency of a state’s criminal justice bureaucracy 
or the conditions within its prisons, for example. More evidently, where an 
extradition request is refused for reasons apart from protecting a requested 
person then law and practice more clearly fail. As will be seen below, the 
high failure rate of Indian extradition requests to the UK supports the need 
for reform and the relevant case law indicates what is required to be done.  
 
2.2 The Applicable Law 
 
The purposes of extradition are given effect by law. That law is found in 
both the realm of public international law and national law. This is because 
extradition is the lawful procedure whereby an accused or convicted person 
is sent from one state or territory to another to stand trial or be imprisoned. 
It is necessarily an inter-state procedure and certain states – including India 
and the UK – require to legislate to give effect to the international 
agreements they have ratified. Simply, with India and the UK being dualist 
in their approach to law both international and domestic law regulate the 
subject. Internationally, the 1992 Treaty governs relations. The agreement 
is unusual in UK practice as relations within the Commonwealth are 
generally governed, or rather conditioned, by the London Scheme.7 The 
1992 Treaty was concluded to formalise relations and to address concerns 
over the application of the political offence exception. Arguing in support of 
the 1992 Treaty in the House of Commons Kenneth Clark stated “It is plainly 
right that we should have up-to-date extradition arrangements between 
India and the United Kingdom. It is particularly important that the so-called 
political defence should not be cited in criminal charges that turn on 
terrorism, from which both our countries suffer”.8 Earlier Douglas Hurd 
described the prospective treaty as helping “… to reassure the Government 
of India that, within what is possible under the laws of the United Kingdom, 
we are anxious to co-operate with them in dealing with terrorism”.9 The 
1992 Treaty contains the common and standard terms10 found in extradition 
agreements and mirrored in model laws on extradition.11 These include a 
                                       
7 This is discussed below. The move from the London Scheme to a bilateral treaty 
was at the behest of India, see House of Commons Debates, 13 January 1992, vol 
201 col 466 per Kenneth Baker, cited at https://api.parliament.uk/historic-
hansard/written-answers/1992/jan/13/india-ministerial-visit.  
8 House of Commons Debate, 11 March 1993, vol 220, col 1088, cited at 
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1993/mar/11/extradition-
india.  
9 House of Commons Debate, 5 February 1992, vol 203, col 272, cited at 
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1992/feb/05/india.  
10 The UN Model Treaty on Extradition contains these provisions, cited at 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_treaty_extradition_revised_manual.pdf.  
11 The articles are often incorporated into national law, in that vein see the UN 
Model Law on Extradition 2004, found at 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_law_extradition.pdf.  
general duty to extradite (article 1), the definition of an extradition offence, 
including double criminality (article 2), the political offence exception 
(article 5) and a provision setting out optional grounds for refusing an 
extradition request. Also within the 1992 Treaty are the rule of speciality 
(article 13) and the prima facie evidence requirement (article 11(3)). These 
articles are particularly relevant to note in discussing the possible reform of 
India-UK extradition law and practice because they have been the basis of 
arguments that have led to requests being refused in UK jurisprudence. 
Further, certain of these rules have been dispensed with or altered in the 
UK’s extradition law and practice with a number of states apart from India.  
 
The domestic law governing extradition within the two countries is in India 
the Extradition Act 196212, and in the UK the Extradition Act 2003.13 In the 
context of UK to India extradition the 2003 Act is of more importance. This 
is because it contains the core rules governing UK hearings where the 
extradition of a person to a third country is considered. Those rules include 
the general features of extradition law and the specific bars to extradition 
discussed below. It should be noted firstly, though, that UK extradition law 
has been amended a number of times over the past several decades. These 
changes include the considerable revision to the law made by the 
Extradition Act 1989, which was in turn repealed and replaced by the 2003 
Act.14 Whilst some of these changes are mentioned below it is worth noting 
here that there is no longer a general political discretion in UK law15 and the 
prima facie evidence requirement has been excepted in certain cases.16 
Giving rise to and affecting the nature of the most recent major revision of 
the law by way of the 2003 Act were the EU Framework Decision on 
                                       
12 The 1964 was amended in 1993, it is found here 
https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/attach/Extradition_Act_1962.pdf. See further 
Saxena, J.A.N., India - The Extradition Act 1962, (1964) 13(1) ICLQ 116. 
13 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/41/contents.  
14 The Extradition Act 1989 repealed the previously applicable statute, the 
Extradition Act 1870, see as to the history of UK extradition law and more generally 
Baker, S., Perry, D., Doobay, A., A Review of the United Kingdom’s Extradition 
Arrangements, 2011, the ‘Baker Review’, found at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/117673/extradition-review.pdf. In contrast to the numerous 
changes to UK extradition law Indian law has remained relatively static since 1962, 
with Subramanian noting that the law “… has not been touched upon except for 
certain piecemeal amendments made in 1986 and in 1993”, supra note 1 at p 235. 
15 In its place are factors, under section 93, that must be considered at the end of 
the judicial process in Category 2 cases (Category 2 territories are those with which 
the UK has international extradition arrangements outside the EU). 
16 In Indian law section 7(3) of the Extradition Act 1962 provides that if a Magistrate 
is of opinion that a prima facie case is not made out in support of the request of 
the foreign state he shall discharge the fugitive criminal. 
Extradition 200217 and the terrorist attacks within the US on 11 September 
2001. Both impacted UK law. A heightened desire to address terrorism and 
international criminality was understandably pronounced at that time. 
Within the EU, the desire to build an area based upon mutual recognition of 
judicial and prosecutorial decisions was realised.18 The UK has been at the 
forefront of these developments both within the EU and with a number of 
its other extradition partners. India-UK practice, on the other hand, remains 
governed by the terms of the 1992 Treaty as concluded over a quarter of a 
century ago.  
 
3. The Arguments in Favour of Reform 
 
3.1 Law and Practice Clearly not Working Well 
 
Pre-eminent amongst the arguments in favour of the reform of India-UK 
extradition law and practice is that it is not working well. There is clear 
evidence of this. Whilst the statistics vary, India has a very low success rate 
in securing individuals from the UK. It appears that of the 28 requests made 
to the UK under the 1992 Treaty as of 30 August 2019 only one has resulted 
in the extradition of the person from the UK to India, that of Samirbhai 
Patel.19  Sanjeev Chawla lost his appeal against extradition in February 2019 
and his transfer is pending.20 More generally it has been noted that 9 of the 
28 Indian requests have been refused with arrest warrants not being issued 
in 3.21 A different expression of the success rate is suggested as only one 
in three fugitives being successfully extradited to India from the UK.22 
Regardless of these variations it is beyond doubt that India has suffered in 
                                       
17 Cited at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32002F0584&from=EN. This is the basis of the 
European Arrest Warrant system. It is discussed further below. 
18 Recital 5 of the Preamble of the Framework Decision inter alia provides that “The 
objective set for the Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice leads 
to abolishing extradition between Member States and replacing it by a system of 
surrender between judicial authorities”, ibid.  
19 Patel lost his appeal against extradition in Patel v India [2013] EWHC 819 
Admin). Patel is listed as the only person transferred from the UK by the Ministry 
of External Affairs as at 31 January 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/toindia.htm.  
20 Chawla’s appeal at the Divisional Court was rejected, in India v Chawla [2018] 
EWHC 3096 (Admin). 
21 See Chaudhury, D.P., UK’s Law a Big Hurdle for India to Extradite Fugitives, The 
Economic Times, 15 June 2018, cited at 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/uks-law-a-big-
hurdle-for-india-to-extradite-fugitives/articleshow/64595380.cms.  
22 Tirkey, A., India’s Challenges in Extraditing Fugitives from Foreign Countries, 28 
November 2018, Observer Research Foundation, at 
https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-challenges-in-extraditing-fugitives-
from-foreign-countries-45809/.   
its attempts to extradite persons from the UK. That noted, however, the 
position may be in the process of improving. The case of Vijay Mallya, for 
example, is proceeding to appeal in 2020 on only one of a number of argued 
grounds.23 His arguments against extradition were rejected at first 
instance.24 It is clear, though, that the success rates of Indian extradition 
requests to the UK stands in stark contrast to the position of the UK with 
certain other states.25 As regards the UK’s EU partners and the US the 
refusal of extradition requests is exceptional. Indeed, the perception 
common in some circles that UK law and practice, including human rights, 
prevents extradition from the UK is largely misplaced.26 The question that 
arises, then, is what is acting to frustrate Indian extradition requests? The 
answer is not simple nor singular. Indeed, there are a multiplicity of factors 
at play which can militate against an extradition in a given case. These 
factors can be categorised, albeit imperfectly, as falling under one of two 
headings; general extradition requirements and specific bars to extradition.  
 
3.2 General Extradition Requirements as Barriers to Extradition 
 
Extradition law contains criteria that require satisfaction prior to an 
individual being transferred from one state to another. In the India-UK 
context they are found in both the 1992 Treaty and the domestic law of 
both states, with the latter applying in individual cases. The general 
requirements that have been put forward in opposition to Indian extradition 
requests are those mandating particular forms and levels of evidence (the 
prima facie evidence requirement), that a requested person is only tried for 
the crime iterated within the request (the speciality principle) and that the 
                                       
23 His leave to appeal application is reported as Mallya v India [2019] EWHC 1849 
(Admin). Persons wanted in India currently based in the UK include Ravi Sankaran, 
wanted in the navy war room leak case, Lalit Modi, sought for money laundering, 
Tiger Hanif, in connection with bomb attacks in Gujarat in 1993 and music director 
Nadeem Saifi in the Gulshan Kumar murder case.  
24 The first hearing at Westminster Magistrates’ Court, India v Mallya, 10 December 
2018, is found at: https://thewire.in/business/vijay-mallya-uk-extradition. A 
further indication of an improving relationship is found in judicial dicta on Indian 
extradition assurances, mentioned below. 
25 It is also clear that the volume of requests under the 1992 Treaty in both 
directions is limited. To give some context, Poland sought 2174 persons from the 
UK over the financial year 2017-2018, and 22 persons were arrested in Poland 




26 See Arnell, P., The Human Rights Influence upon UK Extradition – Myth 
Debunked, (2013) 21 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 
317. 
offence underlying the request is found in the law of the UK as well as India 
(the double criminality rule).  
 
3.2.1 Prima Facie Evidence 
 
Indian and UK extradition law requires that the requesting state provide 
evidence to the requested state that establishes a prima facie case that the 
person concerned committed the offence in question.27 The requirement in 
the 1992 Treaty inter alia provides that the requesting party must provide 
“… such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would 
justify his committal for trial if the offence had been committed in the 
territory of the Requested State”. The formulation in UK law found in section 
84(1) of the 2003 Act. It states that the judge must decide whether the 
request includes evidence which would be sufficient to make a case 
requiring an answer by the person if the proceedings were the summary 
trial of an information against him. The 2003 Act also contains rules on the 
admissibility of evidence in extradition hearings.28 An example of how this 
requirement has frustrated an Indian extradition request under the 
Extradition Act 1989 is Saifi v India.29 Here an application for habeas corpus 
was granted where it was held that the translation of certain evidence was 
inadmissible because it was not independently done and the original 
material was not included in the request. Saifi was discharged.  
 
A case under the 2003 Act where evidential concerns were at issue is India 
v Rajarathinam.30 Rajarathinam was sought for offences of fraud. A 
synopsis of the case against him accompanying the extradition request 
contained content and the conclusions from a firm of chartered accountants 
into the alleged fraud. It was held that this fell outwith the evidential 
requirements of the 2003 Act, and the Government of India was given the 
opportunity to provide admissible evidence upon which the district judge 
could rely. A third example where evidential considerations were live is 
Shankaran v India.31 There, a crucial factual averment that the appellant 
had received an email under the name Vic Branson was found in only one 
of three statements to the police, which was subsequently denied by the 
witness. It was such that the court held that that statement was “far too 
                                       
27 Note that the prima facie evidence requirement will be discussed again below in 
the context of the differential treatment afforded by the UK to its extradition 
partners.  
28 Sections 84(2) and (3) contain relevant rules. Note, though, that extradition 
hearings take a more generous approach to admissibility than criminal hearings in 
UK law, see R. (on the application of B) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2014] 
UKSC 59 at para 21. 
29 [2001] 1 WLR 1134. 
30 [2006] EWHC 2919 (Admin). 
31 [2014] EWHC 957 (Admin). 
slender a basis for founding” the case against Shankaran. He was 
discharged. An instance where evidential concerns were raised but did not 
frustrate extradition is Kapoor v India.32 There the District judge refused an 
appeal against extradition where it was argued that a prima facie case had 
not been made out where there was dispute over handwriting in a passport 
application in a child abduction case.  
 
3.2.2 The Speciality Principle  
 
In general terms the speciality principle provides that an individual may not 
be tried for an offence in the requesting territory that was not iterated in 
the extradition request. It has been of some concern in UK jurisprudence in 
cases following Indian requests. Notably, this arose not from a UK 
precedent, but rather one from Portugal. There Abu Salem had been 
charged in India with crimes not specified in its request to Portugal in breach 
of the rule of speciality.33 In Chawla v India34 the Abu Salem case was put 
forward in support of the contention that the speciality principle might not 
be respected. In response the Divisional Court held that India in fact 
respects the speciality principle and the appeal on that point was refused. 
As to India’s compliance with the principle the Indian Supreme Court in 
Lahoria v Union of India35 notably upheld an appeal where an individual 
extradited from the United States was charged with offences which had not 
formed part of the extradition decree granted by the Texas court. The 
speciality principle was held to exist in customary international law, and 
more relevantly, it was confirmed that it formed part of Indian law by virtue 
of section 21 of the 1962 Act, as amended.  
 
3.2.3 Double Criminality   
 
The third general extradition requirement that has acted as an impediment 
to extradition from the UK to India is double criminality. This is the long-
standing feature of extradition law providing an individual will only be 
extradited if the crime at issue is found in the law of both the requested 
and requesting states. In UK law it is provided for in section 137(3)(b) of 
the 2003 Act, which inter alia provides an extradition offence is one where 
“… the conduct would constitute an offence under the law of the relevant 
                                       
32 [2015] EWHC 1378 (Admin). A further case is that of Vijay Mallya, discussed 
below. 
33 See Tirkey, supra note 22. That noted, India complied with its treaty obligations 




34 Supra note 20.  
35 [2001] 4 LRC 663. 
part of the United Kingdom punishable with imprisonment or another form 
of detention for a term of 12 months or a greater punishment if it occurred 
in that part of the United Kingdom”.36 Whilst there is a considerable overlap 
of offences within the substantive criminal law of India and the UK there 
are exceptions. An example where this acted to frustrate an extradition 
arose where a person was sought for the crime of dowry harassment.37 In 
the case, in 2018, the double criminality requirement frustrated the 
extradition for the reason of there not being a corresponding crime in 
English and Welsh law.38  
 
3.3 Specific Bars to Extradition Frustrating the Process 
 
The specific bars to extradition under the 2003 Act form the second 
category of factors that have acted to frustrate Indian extradition requests 
to the UK. These differ from general extradition requirements in that they 
do not concern a feature within the law that must be satisfied prior to a 
request being acceded to. Rather, they centre upon a circumstance or 
circumstances of a case that justifies the refusal of a request in UK law. 
There are four bars to extradition that have been particularly relevant. 
These are ‘extraneous circumstances’ defined by section 81 of the 2003 Act, 
oppression based on the passage of time under section 82, oppression on 
the grounds of physical or mental health under section 91 and human rights 
under section 87.39 Each of these has to a greater or lesser extent been at 
play in India-UK extradition practice.  
 
3.3.1 Extraneous Considerations – a Political Component 
 
‘Extraneous considerations’ as a bar to extradition include what can be 
considered the modern version of the political offence exception. 
Historically, that exception provided that an extradition request will be 
refused where it is made in order to prosecute someone for a ‘political 
crime’. A version of that exception subsists in article 5 of the 1992 Treaty, 
albeit with material exceptions.40 Namely, article 5(2) contains a list of 
                                       
36 There are variants of this formulation to encompass extraterritorial crimes.  
37 As mentioned by Tirkey, supra note 22. 
38 See https://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/news/indian-dowry-law-blackmail-
extradition-request-rejected-no-dual-criminality.  
39 For the purposes of this article ‘bar’ is referred to in a general sense. It should 
be noted, though, that that word in law refers to the grounds in section 79 of the 
2003 Act alone. 
40 This version of the exception gave rise to dissent, including the view that “… the 
sheer arbitrariness and malice embedded in the treaty should make opposition to 
it a question of principle for all justice loving Indians and Britishers”, in Siddharth, 
V., New Indo-British Extradition Treaty, (1992) 27(47) Economic and Political 
Weekly, 2531. This sentiment was based on vague usage of the word ‘terrorism’ in 
crimes not to be regarded as of a political character. In UK law the 
traditional form of the exception has been removed. It fell in the face of 
concerted international efforts to address terrorism.41 This is seen in the 
difference between the Extradition Act 1989 and the 2003 Act. Section 
6(1)(a) of the Extradition Act 1989 inter alia provided that an extradition is 
barred where the requested person was accused or convicted of an offence 
of a political character. The 2003 Act, in contrast, provides that a request 
will be barred where it is made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing 
an individual on account of, inter alia, his political opinions or that his trial 
or punishment will be prejudiced for those reasons.  
 
An example of traditional conception of the political offence exception being 
argued following an Indian request is Re Government of India and Mubarak 
Ali Ahmed.42 Here, under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881, an applicant 
sought a writ of habeas corpus inter alia on the ground that the proceedings 
against him in India were based on political considerations only. He also 
suggested he had publicly been branded a political spy for Pakistan. The 
High Court held that “If it appeared that the offence with which the prisoner 
was charged was in effect a political offence, no doubt this court would 
refuse to return him”.43 This is a surprising and notable dictum in light of 
the 1881 Act not containing a political offence exception.44 A modern 
instance where the section 81 bar was put forward is India v Mallya45 at 
Westminster Magistrates’ Court. Here Montgomery for Mallya argued that 
India’s case against him is “… a flawed criminal case which has been brought 
to meet a political objective to quell public anger at the accumulation of bad 
debts by Indian state-owned banks”.46 The question for the Court was 
whether “… the request for extradition has been made on account of Dr 
                                       
India. At the time of the conclusion of the 1992 Treaty the Indian Prevention and 
Suppression of Terrorism Act had been proposed. 
41 In this regard India has been designated as a Commonwealth country with which 
sections 24(1)(a) and (2)(a) of the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 apply, by 
the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 (Application of Provisions) (India) Order, SI 
1993/2533. The effect of which was the exclusion of various offences as offences 
of a political character in extraditions to India. Designation followed a heated 
debate in the House of Commons where India’s conduct in Kashmir was referred 
to, see https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199293/cmhansrd/1993-07-
21/Debate-11.html. There is a voluminous literature on this subject generally, 
including Thompson, D.K., The Evolution of the Political Offence Exception in an 
Age of Modern Political Violence, (1983) 9 Yale Journal of World Public Order 315. 
42 [1952] 1 All ER 1060. 
43 Ibid at p 1063.  
44 As will be discussed below, the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 applied as between 
the UK and its colonies, Dominions and possessions and eschewed certain aspects 
of traditional extradition practice.  
45 Supra note 24. 
46 Ibid at para 358. 
Mallya’s political opinions or whether he might be prejudiced at his trial on 
account of his political opinions”.47 Evidence was led in support of this 
contention. In spite of this it was held by the Magistrate that just because 
the Congress and BJP parties are blaming him and others for the state 
banks’ losses does not mean that he is being prosecuted for his political 
opinions, and that suggestions that the head of the CBI was partial were 
unfounded.48  
 
3.3.2 Oppression – Passage of Time 
 
Oppression as a bar under the 2003 Act takes two forms. One is that based 
on the passage of time. For Category 2 states it is found in section 82.49 It 
inter alia provides an extradition is oppressive by reason of the passage of 
time if (and only if) it appears that it would be unjust or oppressive to 
extradite him by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have 
committed the extradition offence. A case following an Indian request that 
graphically illustrates the operation of this bar is India v Angurala.50 Here a 
former branch manager employed by the Bank of India and his wife were 
successful in resisting their extradition from the UK. The District Judge held 
that to extradite the pair would be unjust or oppressive by virtue of the 
passage of time. The facts of the case were that over 25 years had elapsed 
since the conduct which allegedly gave rise to the extradition crime, fraud, 
and in the course of that period authorities in India knew or could have 
known of the whereabouts of the requested persons in the UK. A case where 
the passage of time had been accepted as blocking an extradition by the 
Divisional Court under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 but was overturned 
by the House of Lords is India v Narang.51 It was held that the Divisional 
Court erred by considering circumstances not relevant to the ground argued 
by the requested persons. The appeal by India was allowed.  
 
3.3.3 Oppression - Mental or Physical Health 
 
The second form of oppression bar to extradition in UK law acts to prevent 
an extradition on the grounds of the physical or mental health of the 
                                       
47 Ibid at para 357. 
48 Ibid at paras 376-377. 
49 Section 10 of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 contained a general oppression 
bar, whereby a superior court could discharge a fugitive where the case was trivial, 
it was not made in good faith, or having regard to the circumstances of the case it 
would unjust or oppressive or too severe a punishment. A case where this was 
unsuccessfully argued in an Indian context is Henderson v Secretary of State 
[1950] 1 All ER 283.   
50 Cited at 
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5b2897d12c94e06b9e19bb2f.  
51 [1978] AC 247. 
requested person. This form of the bar has acted to frustrate an Indian 
extradition request. It did so in India v Ashley.52 Here India appealed a 
decision of a District Judge that the requested person’s mental health was 
such that it would be unjust and oppressive to extradite him. Ashley was 
accused of various sexual offences against children. India’s appeal was 
refused because the Court accepted that Ashley’s mental health condition, 
dementia, was permanent. Here, of course, there was nothing that India 
could have done to overcome the bar. In other cases, however, diplomatic 
assurances stipulating that the requested person will be afforded the 
treatment needed to address his or her health needs have been successfully 
employed. Such a case in the UK’s practice with South Africa is that of 
Shiren Dewani. There the fact that Dewani’s mental health condition was 
considered temporary led to his conditional extradition to South Africa for 
a set period during which he would be examined in order to decide whether 
he continued to be unfit to plead.53   
 
3.3.4 Human Rights   
 
The final bar in UK law that has played a role in hindering extradition from 
the UK to India is that based on human rights. The bar provides that if a 
judge decides that the requested person’s extradition is not compatible with 
the rights found in schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 he must order 
his discharge. The most relevant rights are those protecting a person from 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment under article 
3, the rights to liberty (article 5) and a fair trial (article 6) and the right to 
respect for private and family life (article 8). Of these it appears that the 
most common human rights argument in hearings considering Indian 
extradition requests are that the prison conditions in India in which a 
requested person will be held, prior or subsequent to conviction, are such 
as to give rise to a breach of article 3.54 In India v Chawla55 the Divisional 
Court agreed with the District Judge’s view that there was a real risk that 
Chawla would be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment at Tihar 
prison in New Delhi contrary to article 3, and sought further assurances 
from India. Notably those assurances were later held to satisfy the 
Divisional Court’s concerns.56 In Mallya’s case an argument based upon 
                                       
52 [2014] EWHC 3505 (Admin).  
53 See Dewani v South Africa [2012] EWHC 842 (Admin) and South Africa v Dewani 
[2014] EWHC 153 (Admin). Diplomatic assurances in the India-UK context are 
mentioned below. 
54 An instance where prison conditions are said to have been relevant in barring an 
extradition to India is noted by the London law firm Peters and Peters, at 
https://www.petersandpeters.com/leading-cases/successful-discharge-from-
extradition-for-a-uk-citizen-wanted-by-the-government-of-india/.  
55 [2018] EWHC 1050 (Admin). 
56 In India v Chawla, supra note 20. 
prison conditions within the Arthur Road jail in Mumbai was rejected, in part 
on account of Westminster Magistrates’ Court receiving video evidence 
regarding the conditions there.57 A request to appeal this aspect of the 
District Judge’s decision was refused on the basis of Indian assurances 
providing where Mallya would be detained and what treatment, including 
medical assistance, he would be afforded.58 A case where article 3 was 
successfully invoked was that of Arti Dhir and Kaval Raijada, where Chief 
Magistrate Emma Arbuthnot held that the mandatory and irreducible life 
sentence they would face if convicted of the murder of their adopted child 
was not compatible with article 3.59  
 
In Patel v India60 it was not prison conditions in India or the prospective 
sentence that formed the basis of a human rights argument, rather it was 
the suggestion that Patel would not receive a fair trial under article 6. As 
noted above, this argument was unsuccessful and Patel was returned to 
India. A further case where the right to a fair trial was put forward, again 
mentioned above, is Re Government of India and Mubarak Ali Ahmed.61 In 
response to the argument Lord Goddard CJ notably stated “I think it would 
be an impossible position for this court to take up to say that they would 
not return a person for trial to a country which is a member of the 
Commonwealth and where it is known that courts of justice have been 
presided over by Indian judges for very many years because we thought 
the court would not give him a for trial. That would be an insult to the courts 
of India”.62 Clearly, whilst human rights arguments have acted to bar 
extraditions from the UK to India their success is far from certain.63   
 
3.4 Reform Could and Should Reprise Certain Historical Features   
 
                                       
57 As noted in Tirkey, supra note 22. Similarly, in Kapoor v India, supra note 32, 
an argument based on prison conditions was not successful – where those 
conditions in the Punjab did not form an argument in the appeal, at para 45. 
58 Mallya v India, supra note 23. 
59 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-49592362. India 
successfully sought leave to appeal in October 2019. It is scheduled for 2020. 
60 Supra note 16. An argument based on prison conditions was rejected by the 
District Judge.  
61 Supra note 42. 
62 Ibid. This reasoning mirrors certain of the arguments made below.  
63 The reluctance of Indian authorities to expose their prison conditions to scrutiny 
appears to have come to an end. It has been noted in this regard that “In recent 
years the Indian Government has refused to allow inspections of prisons by UK 
experts for the purpose of providing expert reports in extradition cases. 
Westminster magistrates court took a robust view and drew adverse inferences if 
prison inspections were refused. This all changed with the Mallya case”, see 
https://www.bindmans.com/news/recent-developments-in-extradition-and-
prison-conditions-are-assurances-suf. 
The fact that the extradition arrangements between India and the UK are 
not working well is the pre-eminent argument in favour of reform. It is not 
the only one, however. A further reason is that it is desirable and 
appropriate to reprise aspects of historical precedent in the area. Of course, 
the relationship between India and the UK is today one founded upon each 
being an equal and sovereign state. Indeed, as the Indian Supreme Court 
itself noted in an extradition case “It is time to realize that India is now a 
significant and important player in the world stage”.64 There is no doubt, 
however, that the two countries share a common legal heritage and cultural 
affinity as well as a strong desire to enhance the degree of criminal co-
operation between them. These factors support looking to the past. The law 
that governed extradition between India and the UK prior to Indian 
independence was the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881.65 Extradition relations 
between India and the UK, therefore, were governed by a UK statute and 
not international law.66 For India generally the 1881 Act applied as between 
Commonwealth countries, and the Extradition Act 1903 for all others.67  
Post-independence both were repealed and replaced by the Extradition Act 
1962.68 What is of particular note in the 1881 Act is that it eschewed aspects 
of extradition practice applying as between sovereign states. In particular 
the 1881 Act did not contain double criminality or speciality provisions. 
Further and notably the 1881 Act also did not contain a political offence 
exception (that was introduced in 1967 as for Commonwealth countries). 
Indeed, the 1881 Act specifically included treason as an extraditable 
offence. A suggestion that this be excluded made in a committee report 
prior to its enactment was refused by the UK Attorney General.69 The 
absence of double criminality, speciality and the political offence exception 
under the 1881 Act illustrates the close and intricate extradition relationship 
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at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101513838/. 
65 Hereinafter the 1881 Act. 
66 See generally Clute, R.E., Law and Practice in Commonwealth Extradition, (1959) 
8(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 15, at p 15. 
67 Within India the Extradition Act 1903 was enacted to provide more convenient 
administration of extradition in India, see the Delhi High Court case of Verhoeven 
v Union of India, 21 September 2015, at para 7, cited at 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/18537853/. The case was overturned by the Indian 
Supreme Court, supra note 64. The 1881 Act replaced the 1843 Act for the better 
apprehension of certain offenders 6 & 7 Vict. C. 34. Prior to 1843 surrender took 
place pursuant to the proviso to section 15 of the Habeas Corpus Act 1679, which 
permitted the sending of persons to be tried in Scotland, Ireland or any of the 
islands or foreign plantations of the King, see Baker Review, supra note 14 at page 
42, footnote 61. 
68 The procedures under the 1881 Act applied prior to 26 January 1950. Under the 
Adaptation of Laws Order 1950 the Indian Extradition Act 1903 was held to apply 
to the Native States. 
69 As noted in Clute, supra note 66 at p 24. 
between India and the UK at that point. It is not presently suggested that 
all of these are presently removed from India–UK extradition relations.70 
There is a feature of past practice under the 1881 Act, however, that does 
merit resurrection.  
 
The 1881 Act contained a prima facie evidence requirement within section 
5. It inter alia provided that if the warrant was duly authenticated and “… 
such evidence is produced as… raises a strong or probable presumption that 
the fugitive committed the offence… the magistrate shall commit the 
fugitive to prison to await his return…”. Notably, however, Part II of the 
1881 Act permitted the prima facie requirement to be dispensed with as 
regards contiguous territories.71 This is what happened between India and, 
inter alia, Hong Kong, the then Federated Malay States and Brunei by an 
Order in Council 2 January 1918. The Order inter alia stated “… by reasons 
of their contiguity or the frequent intercommunication between them it 
seems expedient to His Majesty and conducive to the better administration 
of justice therein to [apply Part II of the 1881 Act]”. As was noted in C.G. 
Menon v India “As the laws prevailing in those possessions were 
substantially the same, the requirement that no fugitive will be surrendered 
unless a prima facie case was made against him was dispensed with”.72 It 
is submitted that it is this feature of the historical practice that merits 
reapplication. Whilst admittedly it did not apply as between India and the 
UK but rather ‘contiguous territories’ its justification has a modern 
resonance. The 1881 Act was an “… easy administrative expedient for the 
return of fugitives from one part of the Empire to another without their ever 
leaving the jurisdiction of the highest court of appeal”.73 Whilst India does 
not fall under the jurisdiction of the UK Supreme Court both states are 
bound by international obligations including the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966 and so a somewhat similar argument can be 
made. The joint human rights obligations and the protections under the 
1992 Treaty, in light of the legal and historical affinity between India and 
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criminality requirement has been supplemented with the inclusion of a Framework 
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71 The system was termed inter-colonial backing of warrants. 
72 (1954) AIR (SC) 517. Note, however, that the Madras High Court in the case 
held whilst the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 was in effect in India Part II of the Act 
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that the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, was not in force in respect to India, at 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1309162/. 
73 Describing the 1881 Act, Clute, supra note 66 at p 27. The court being the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council under the 1881 Act.  
the UK, lead to the conclusion that it is now time to revert to a degree of 
similar co-operation.74  
 
A bridge between the historical practice between India and the UK and the 
arguments in favour of reform is the Commonwealth Scheme for the 
Rendition of Fugitive Offenders 1966 also known as the London Scheme.75 
Whilst having its origins in the system under the Fugitive Offenders Act 
1881, it has been updated and amended over time, in 1986, 1990 and 2002. 
The Scheme comprises an agreed set of recommendations intended to 
guide governments in their extradition relations inter se.76 It was designed 
to encourage the adoption of law and practices that will result in an efficient 
and effective co-operation.77 The Scheme, along with the 1992 Treaty, have 
been said to support “… the presumption of good faith” as between the 
parties.78 Of particular note within the Scheme is clause 5(4), providing a 
prima facie evidence requirement. As under the 1881 Act this may be 
dispensed with, as per clause 6. That provides that two or more parts of 
the Commonwealth may replace the requirement by either Annex 3 of the 
Scheme or other provision that they agree. Annex 3 provides that a 
certificate issued by the Attorney General of the requesting territory stating 
that in his opinion the case discloses evidence sufficient to justify a 
prosecution can replace the requirement. It appears clear that the Scheme 
provides a possible template for reform in this regard. 
 
3.5 Reform Could End UK Differentiation of India  
 
The UK treats its extradition partners differently. This is not in itself 
exceptional. States are of course free to enter into extradition agreements 
                                       
74 Examining extradition practice in the Commonwealth in 1959 Clute concluded 
that it “… may well be an area in which Commonwealth countries will choose to 
abandon the Commonwealth law in favor of the law of nations”, supra note 66 at 
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but not its form.  
75 1966, Cmnd 3008. It is found here: 
http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/key_reform_pdfs/P15370_13_RO
L_Schemes_Int_Cooperation.pdf.  
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arrangements which provide a constructive and pragmatic approach to mutual co-
operation in Commonwealth countries”, cited at 
http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/key_reform_pdfs/P15370_13_RO
L_Schemes_Int_Cooperation.pdf.   
77 See Prost, K., Breaking Down the Barriers: International Co-operation in 
Combating Transnational Crime, Information Exchange Network for Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters and Extradition 2007, Organisation of American 
States, at 
https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/can/en_can_prost.en.html#ftnref10.  
78 Patel v India, supra note 19 at para 14.  
of whatever nature, or not, with third states. Indeed, as just discussed there 
has existed especial provision of varying types within the Empire and 
Commonwealth for over a century. However, the fact that India is presently 
in the third tier of four within UK law in level of trust and minimisation of 
formality is of note. For reasons akin to reviving aspects of the historical 
arrangement between the countries the distinction in law and practice 
between the UK and the EU and other select states and the UK and India 
requires consideration. The features of law that vary as between the UK’s 
partners are the prima facie evidence requirement, double criminality and 
political involvement in extradition decisions. A relaxation or abolition of 
one or more of these features leads to a streamlined extradition process 
and one where the success rate of extradition requests increases. The four 
approaches in UK law are that under the EAW system, that under a bilateral 
treaty where the prima facie evidence requirement is dispensed, that under 
a bilateral treaty and the London Scheme, and that applying in the absence 
of an extradition agreement. In the first two of these the UK has lessened 
certain of the formal extradition requirements normally applicable.  
 
The modern divergence in UK extradition practice has its origins in the 2003 
Act. It is the basis of the differences between the India-UK relationship and 
those between the UK and its EU partners and the UK and a number of 
other states. The UK’s closest co-operation is with its EU partners under the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant.79 Particularly notable 
here are the removal of the prima facie evidence requirement, a novel 
double criminality approach, and the lack of political involvement in the 
process. As to the first, prima facie evidence is not needed. This ground-
breaking development is based on the principles of mutual trust and 
recognition. Under the EAW what is required is evidence that, on the 
balance of probabilities, the person before the judge is in fact the person 
referred to in the arrest warrant and confirmation that a form of double 
criminality is met. This latter requirement under the EAW is also novel. In 
addition to a traditional iteration of double criminality the Framework 
Decision provides that the requirement is met if the offence is listed in a 
Framework List of Offences, found in article 2(2), and if the offence is 
punishable in the issuing state by a maximum period of at least three 
years.80 Finally as to the EAW, political involvement in the process has been 
completely removed. The final decision on extradition is that of the judge 
at the hearing, and not the Secretary of State. Cumulatively, EU Member 
States have agreed to a system of rendition that is more properly 
designated one of surrender than extradition. Clearly, with its EU partners 
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punishable by imprisonment for a maximum period of at least 12 months in the 
requested state, in articles 2(1) and 2(4). 
the UK operates a system of extradition considerably different from that 
applying with India.  
 
The second tier of co-operation within UK law is akin to the traditional 
approach, with a material exception. This allows the prima facie evidence 
requirement to be dispensed with.81 The requirement applies in the first 
instance to all the UK’s partners apart from those within the EU.82 Section 
84(7), however, empowers the Secretary of State to designate territories 
with the effect of removing the requirement. In those cases, requesting 
territories must merely provide information that would justify the issue of 
an arrest warrant, called the reasonable suspicion test.83 Once this is met 
no further evidence of culpability of the requested person is required. This 
is a lesser burden on the requesting state.84 This power has been exercised 
on a number of occasions. India, however, has not been designated.85 
Amongst the states that have been are Albania, Azerbaijan, Russia, the 
Republic of Korea, Ukraine and South Africa.86 These territories have been 
designated because they are party along with the UK to the European 
Convention on Extradition 1957 (ECE), which mandates extradition without 
the requirement. Notably, however, the territories of Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the United States have also been designated although not 
party to the 1957 Convention. India’s absence from the list merits redress.  
 
The approach to diplomatic assurances is a further subject where there 
appears to have been a degree of divergence in UK practice between India 
and certain other states. Notably, though, this may have come to an end 
with recent dicta treating assurances from India in a manner akin to those 
from the UK’s close partners. The origins of the scepticism of Indian 
assurances in UK practice is not a UK judicial decision, but rather a 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. In the deportation case 
                                       
81 As noted above, the role of the Secretary of State has been curtailed in all 
Category 2 cases. 
82 It is described above. The requirement is also found in section 86(1) where it 
applies to requests where the individual has been convicted in absentia.  
83 Under sections 71(3) and (4) of the 2003. 
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86 The statutory instrument The Extradition Act 2003 (Designation of Part 2 
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of Chahal v UK87 the ECtHR held that assurances given by the Indian 
Government did not have the effect of mitigating concerns over the possible 
violation of article 3 were Chahal transferred to India. In a majority decision 
it stated “Although the Court does not doubt the good faith of the Indian 
Government in providing the assurances… the violation of human rights by 
certain members of the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere in India is 
a recalcitrant and enduring problem”.88 In the Court of Appeal judgment 
prior to the ECtHR decision those assurances were accepted.89  
 
Within UK jurisprudence there are no reported extradition cases where 
Indian assurances have been rejected.90 On the contrary, in India v 
Chawla91 the Divisional Court quoted from a case setting out the position 
on assurances, Giese v US, that “…"whilst there may be states whose 
assurances should be viewed through the lens of a technical analysis of the 
words used and suspicion that they will do everything possible to wriggle 
out of them, that is not appropriate when dealing with friendly foreign 
governments of states governed by the rule of law where the expectation 
is that promises given will be kept".92 It then notably followed that passage 
with “India is a friendly foreign government”.93 The court then went on to 
examine the nature and specificity of a third assurance India had provided 
as regards prison space and conditions, intra-prisoner violence and medical 
facilities in Tihar prisons in Delhi and concluded that it was satisfied that it 
was sufficient to demonstrate that there was no real risk that Chawal would 
be subjected to impermissible treatment in Tihar prisons.94 Similarly, the 
assurances given by India in Mallya’s case were accepted by both 
Westminster Magistrates’ Court at his initial extradition hearing and the 
Divisional Court when considering leave to appeal. The Divisional Court held 
“… the court is bound, in accordance with the presumption of good faith, to 
accept such assurances at face value unless there is cogent evidence which 
calls them into question. In this case the senior district judge considered 
the assurances given to be clear, binding and sufficient, and on any appeal 
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91 Supra note 20. 
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the UK court.  
that assessment is entitled to great respect”.95 The terms of the willingness 
to accept Indian assurances by UK courts appears to signal a new stage in 
India-UK practice.96 The clear judicial support for Indian assurances in line 
with those given by the UK’s trusted extradition partners supports the 
minimisation of the divergence in the UK’s extradition practice towards 
India more generally.  
 
3.6 New Geopolitical Realities and a Desire for Enhanced Co-operation 
 
The final argument in favour of the reform of the India-UK extradition 
relationship is that it would reflect geopolitical realities and an enhanced 
desire for co-operation. The former takes the form of the rise of India 
economically and politically and the UK’s pivot away from the EU. 
Accordingly, it is appropriate that the extradition relationship between the 
two countries adjust to these facts and more effectively facilitate 
international criminal justice between them. In support of this facet of the 
argument are both the statement of Prime Ministers Mohi and May following 
their 2016 meeting and a House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
Report. The Joint Statement between the Governments of the UK and India, 
7 November 2016, affirmed “… their strong commitment to enhance co-
operation under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. The 2 leaders agreed 
that fugitives and criminals should not be allowed to escape the law. They 
expressed their strong commitment to facilitate outstanding extradition 
requests from both sides”.97 The statement also contained a specific section 
on ‘extradition, returns and mobility’. It inter alia stated that the Prime 
Ministers “… directed that the officials dealing with extradition matters from 
both sides should meet at the earliest to develop better understanding of 
each countries’ legal processes and requirements, share best practices, and 
identify the causes of delays and expedite pending requests. They also 
agreed that regular interactions between the relevant India-UK authorities 
would be useful to resolve all outstanding cases expeditiously”.98 From the 
UK perspective, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
published a report in June 2019 entitled Building Bridges: Reawakening UK-
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India Ties.99 The Summary of this Report provides “India’s place in the world 
is changing fast, and UK strategy has not yet adjusted to this new reality. 
As the UK prepares to leave the EU, it is time to reset this relationship. We 
cannot afford to be complacent or rely on historical connections to deliver 
a modern partnership”.100 The Committee clearly recognises the importance 
of enhancing the UK’s relationship and co-operation with India. The Report 
concluded that “In an increasingly unstable world threatened by autocratic 
states with contempt for the rules-based international system, it is more 
important than ever before that the UK and India support each other—and 
our mutual allies”.101  
 
4. What Reform is Needed 
 
The case in favour of the reform of India-UK extradition and practice law is 
clear. The arguments are weighty and varied. Having made that case, it is 
necessary to highlight the changes required. These are, of course, closely 
related to the case for reform – any changes must act to address or at least 
minimise the problems identified. They must also reconfigure the 
relationship in order to reflect the affinity between the countries and the 
new political will to co-operate more fully. The single most important 
reforms required are those which lead to more effective and timely co-
operation between the Indian and UK authorities. In this vein amendment 
of the 1992 Treaty is not required. Evidential concerns, speciality 
arguments, possible political influence in trial and punishment, the passage 
of time and doubts about prison and detention conditions can all be 
addressed through improved extradition practice not changes in 
international or domestic law. These must largely take place in India. They 
must also be driven by enhanced and effective communication between the 
UK judiciary and prosecutors and the CPV Division of India’s Ministry of 
External Affairs. If changes to practice facilitated by improved 
communication of UK requirements and in the light of the jurisprudence 
discussed above were to occur the factors impeding rendition from the UK 
to India would largely be addressed. It is important to note here, however, 
that India is not wholly responsible for the problems affecting the 
relationship. There is no doubt also that the UK subjects extradition 
requests from all states to specific and detailed conditions of a more 
stringent nature than most other countries. With reference to US outgoing 
practice, for example, the Baker Review stated “… extradition proceedings 
in the United Kingdom are far more elaborate than their equivalent 
procedures in the United States. This latter point explains why, as a matter 
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100 Ibid at p 3.  
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of practice, extradition from the United Kingdom to the United States is 
generally more difficult to secure than vice versa”.102 Accordingly, in light 
of the UK’s relatively demanding approach, Indian practice must be 
specifically tailored to its needs and requirements. This need not be overly 
burdensome. It does require, though, diligence, consistency and efficiency 
in order to satisfy UK law.103 This is precisely what the Prime Ministers of 
India and the UK argued for in 2016.  
 
A reform that is needed in UK law is the designation of India as a territory 
not required to provide prima facie evidence in conjunction with a request. 
By taking this step the UK would include India with the Category 2 partners 
it has placed a higher degree of trust. As noted, there are states that are 
not party to the ECE that have been designated. In debating the possibility 
of including such non-parties Baroness Scotland in 2003 said in the House 
of Lords, after noting that the United States would not be required to 
provide that level of evidence: 
“There is a case for removing the prima facie evidential requirement 
for a small number of Commonwealth partners whose criminal justice 
systems can be trusted and with whom we have a significant volume 
of business. No final judgments have been made, but we have in 
mind… countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand…. Our 
relations with those countries are based on the Commonwealth 
extradition scheme…”.104 
It appears clear that the time has come for India to be included amongst 
these states and territories. Both the political statements in favour of 
enhanced co-operation as well as the judicial dicta confirming that India is 
a ‘friendly foreign government’ and one in which trust should be placed 
militate in favour of this move. The 1992 Treaty does not bar this 
development. Whilst article 11(3) requires requests to be accompanied by 
evidence that would justify the committal for trial, the particular use of that 
evidence within UK extradition hearings is governed by the 2003 Act. If 
India was designated, UK courts would simply no longer apply the prima 
facie evidence requirement. The effect of a move is clear. India would be a 
partner on par with Canada, the United States and Australia – not to 
mention all those states party to the ECE. Practically, it would also affect 
cases such as Mallya’s – whose leave to appeal application has been allowed 
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on the sole ground that it was arguable that the Senior District Judge erred 
in finding that the prima facie requirement was satisfied.105 The crux of the 
decision about designation is whether it is appropriate to continue to, in 
effect, look behind Indian requests or whether instead the UK should place 
trust in India’s prosecutors and judicial system and accept that only bona 




The efficacy of the law, historical precedent, ending differentiation in 
treatment, India’s rise and the UK’s new international outlook and the 
stated desire of both countries to enhance criminal co-operation all lend 
support to the reform of India-UK extradition law and practice. The most 
important reforms are not legal, however. They concern the operation of 
the existing law, rather than the rules themselves. Evidential difficulties and 
the passage of time, for example, have frustrated Indian requests. These 
can be immediately addressed with improvements in practice and 
processes. The relationship would also, however, benefit from India being 
designated under the 2003 Act as not being required to provide evidence in 
support of a prima facie case with its extradition requests. There is 
precedent for this under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 and provision for 
it under the Commonwealth Scheme. Modern international and 
transnational criminality demand an effective response that acts to facilitate 
criminal justice across borders and yet protects the rights of accused and 
convicted persons. There is a strong case that India and the UK reform their 
law and practice to meet these important goals.  
 
                                       
105 Mallya v India, supra note 23 at paras 10-14. 
